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Bak simdi matematiksel hesaba gore okey ayni farkeden birsey yok diosun simdide bam baska birsey diyorsunAlıntı:
Originally Posted by tcspirit
İkiz sirket ornegini siz anlayasiniz mantigi diye veriyorum.
Ozman bana boyp hissesi nasil kazandirmis acikla
Boyp hissesini alanlarin akli kafasi calismiyormu
Nasilnkazandirdi boypnhissesi temettude dagitmiyor neden kazandirdi
[QUOTE=ekizhuseyin;302452]Alıntı:
Originally Posted by erhanacikgoz1
Ben tesekkur ederim bu vesile ile bilanconun kar egrisine oz varlik karliligina vb diger bilgikerinde artik cok daha onemlinoldugunu birazda olsa hissettirdiysem ne mutlu bana.Alıntı:
Originally Posted by erhanacikgoz1
Tekbyukselis sebebinin temettu olmadigi ortaya cikmis okdugunu dusunuyorum.
Yeninkonu basligi actigimda hersey daha iyi olacaktir
Bu konu forumun daha onceki versiyonundada cok tartisildi.
Ayni seyler soylendi, ayni cevaplar verildi.
Temettü konusunun iki aktörü var,
1-Dağıtan
2-Alan
İkisi açısından etkisizlik meselesi değisir.
En klasik örnek yine Buffet, 1980 yılların sonunda topladığı Cola hisselerinin temettüsünü 30 yıldır takır takır alırken, kendi şirketinden temettü vermez.
Borsa manipülasyon, psikoloji, ekonomi, siyaset gibi bir sürü faktörden etkilenir. Öyle ortaya matematik formüller koyarak sanal gerçeklikle, oluşanı yada olacak olanı eşleştiremezsiniz. Matematik formüllerle doğru olan, gerçekleşecek olanmış gibi sunulamaz.
Temettüyü hisse satarak kendimde çikarırim deyip, olacağıni varsaydığınız hisse fiyatlarını matematik formüllere uygularsanız elbette haklı görünürsünüz. Ama varsaydığınız rakamlar gerceklesmeyeceği için kağıt ustünde oldugunuz haklılık realitede olmaz.
Matematik bazlı hareket ederseniz, satarak kendinize yarattığınız o temettu döngüsününde surdurulebilir bir sey olmayacağı ortaya çıkar. Zira bir süre sonra elinizdeki hisse adedi mikro lotlar seviyesine, hisse değeri ise inanılmaz yüksek olmaya başlar. Matematik olarak doğrumu doğru ama gercekle bağdaşırmı hayır.
Matematik formüllerle izahat doğru yere götürmez bizi.
Bir şirket iyi yönetiliyor ve kar ediyorsa temettü veriyor diye zayıflamayacağı gibi şirket kötü yönetiliyor ve kar etmiyorsa, temettü vermiyor diye sağlam da demek değildir. Borsaya acik bir sirketin piyasa değeri yukardada belirttigim gibi bir cok faktore bagli olarak belirlenir. Aman bana temettu veren sirketin değeri temettü kadar düser argümanı ile gelmeyin. Zaten bunun boyle oldugunu bilmiyorsak durum vahim demektır.
Bunu gecelim, hatta şirketin piyasa degeri tartışmalarınıda geçelım.
Kağit üstünde yapılan matematik formüllerin matematik bilimi açısından doğru olduğu ama gercekle bağdasamayabileceği kavşağınıda geçelim yaşanmış gercekler düzlüğünde yavaşlayalım.
Bizler küçük yatirımcıyız. O halde Buffet amcanin şirket sahibi şapkasını çıkarıp, hisse yatırımcısı olarak sergilediği davranısa bakalım. Buffet gilette, cola gibi pek çok hisseyi 30senedir elinde tutmayı tercih etmis olması gelısi guzel bir tercih olmasa gerek. Tekrar bulup yazacak vaktim yok ama, eski forumda isteyen arayıp bulabilir, Buffet 30 yıl önce yatırdığı paranin 5 katıni artık sadece bir senede temettü alır hale gelmiştir. Temettü yatırimcisı olarak hisselerin artan azalan fiyatlarıyla değıl adediyle ilgilendiğini sürekli soylemistir.
Ayni Buffet masanın diğer tarafina geçince temettü vermemeyi tercih etmiştir.
Nihayetinde her iki yaklaşımda basarılı.
Resmin neresinden baktığına gore gordugun değisiyor.
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Buffet yatirimcilarina ne demis temettu hakkinda onuda soyle ?
Daha burada tartisan adamlar matematiksel olarak bile bu okayi bilmiyorlar temettuyu extra gelir zannneden onlarca adam var.
Daha ben isin gerceklik boyutunu gectim matrmatiksel boyutunu dahi anlatamiyorum ki.
Git bir temettu sayfasina matematiksel sonucu anlat bakalim ne diyecekler sana baska yorum yapma matematiksel olarak boyle de ve uzatma daha buna bile diyorlarki yok o oyle degil
Hesapla oyle diyorum yok degil oyle diyor.
Matematigini anlamamis birisine gercekle ilgili neyi tartisacaksin adam daha matematiksel karsikiginidan bir haber
Bu matematigi niye yapiyoruz extra gelir yaratmadıgını anlasin diye
Yani senin dedigin gibi durum daha vahim noktasinda vahim noktasini gecmek icin matematigini ogrenmeleri gerek sonra bu kisilerle gercek piyasada ne okdugunu oturalim tartisalim
Ama temettuyu extra gelir zanneden bir gurupla neyi tartisacaksin daha ondan bir haber tonlarca adam var
ingilizcesi olan okusun ve özetini cıkartabilirse cıkarsın...
Buffetin temettü ile ilgili mektubu
Dividends
A number of Berkshire shareholders – including some of my good friends – would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.
A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business – projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.
I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.
Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.
Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolton acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire.
And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.
Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?
I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.
But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.
Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.
The third use of funds – repurchases – is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.
But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.
And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.
We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with $2 million of net worth. The business earns 12% on tangible net worth – $240,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.
You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out $80,000 of current earnings and retain $160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the onethird payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).
After ten years our company would have a net worth of $4,317,850 (the original $2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be $86,357. Each of us would have shares worth $2,698,656 (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after – with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.
There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.
Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to $6,211,696 after ten years ($2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $2,243,540. And, remember, every dollar of net worth attributable to each of us can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.
Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! – you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.
This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.
Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history – admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated – the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.
Aside from the favorable math, there are two further – and important – arguments for a sell-off policy.
First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them – perhaps even most of them – are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.
The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)
The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior – usually far inferior – to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.
Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 41⁄4% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.
Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005.
Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 41⁄2% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).
************
Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.
Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively. We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.
At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.
Maalesef piyasada yatırımcının ne denli bilinçsiz olduğunu gösteren elemanlardan bir tanesidir bu.Temettünün hariçten verilen bir para sanılması.Aslında teknik olarak işin içine vergi de girince zarardır. Aslolan şu ki temettü veren şirket kar etmiştir, kar eden hisse prim yapar, basit bi mantıkla yazıyorum tabi.Öte yandan piyasayla ilgilenemeyen kişiler için temettü veren şirketlerin tercih edilmesi de gayet mantıklıdır bence.Alıntı:
Originally Posted by erhanacikgoz1
Yatırım tavsiyesi değildir.
Erhan bey, bizde bunu diyoruz iste. Adamın tüm açıklaması yatırımcısını sirket temetü vermezse sunu yapar bunu yapar guclu olura ikna üzerine. Bu yaklasima sirket tarafindan itiraz eden yok.
Biz ayni kisinin hisse yatirimcisi olarak tam tersıni yaptigini bizlerinde hısse yatırımcısı olarak bunu neden goz onunde bulundurmamamiz gerektiğinin cevabını arıyoruz aciklamalarinizda
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Extra gelir ifadesinden neyi kastettiğiniz yatırımı hangi kosulda yaptiğinizla ilgili bir sey. Onuda öyle tek bir kalibın icine sokup temettü extradır veya değildir diyemezsiniz.
Ornegin gecen sene 15 Temmuz sonrası 0,78 den Isyat almis ve henüz bir ay once 12,5 kurus almis adama bugun donupte temettu extra degil derseniz anlamsız gelir.
Buffet'a donup ya arkadas 1988'de hata yapmissın temettü extra bir sey degili nasıl acıklarsınız peki. Onüne matematik formüller filan mı koyacaksınız. Adam, arkadas formülün doğruda, ben sadece bu sene 1988'de koydugum paranın 3 katini tek seferde aldım dese ne diyeceksiniz. Adama ya senin aldığın temettuyü zaten hisse satarak bende yapabilırim tadında matematik formüllemi cevap vereceksiniz.
Bir realite var birde sanal gercekliğe dayanan bende yapabilirim yaklasımı.
Hadi Buffet tan vaygectim. Bunu 15 Temmuz sonrası Is Yat alan adamada anlatamazsınız zaten.
Ama 23 Martta 1,02'den Is Yat alan adamada temettü extradır'ı anlatamazsınız.
Konuyu kalıplara sikıstırmaya calısirsanız dogru olmaz kısacası.
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