Friday August 23 2024 Actual Previous Consensus
02:30 AM
JP
Inflation Rate YoY JUL 2.8% 2.8%
02:30 AM
JP
Core Inflation Rate YoY JUL 2.7% 2.6% 2.7%
Friday August 23 2024 Actual Previous Consensus
02:30 AM
JP
Inflation Rate YoY JUL 2.8% 2.8%
02:30 AM
JP
Core Inflation Rate YoY JUL 2.7% 2.6% 2.7%
Üye
Originally Posted by deniz43
https://x.com/BloombergHT/status/1826535739863011397
Hazýr giyim ve ayakkabý sektörü devletten destek istedi
��Bölgesel asgari ücret
��Asgari ücret desteði
��Uygun orta vadeli kredi
��Özel kur
��Ýthalatta korumanýn kalkmasý
��SGK yüklerinin azaltýlmasý
Sektörün içinden birisi olarak durum çok kötü.
Kendini verimliliðe, süreçlere adamamýþ bir çok firma sektörde var.
Zamanýnda çok para kazandýlar.
Bundan sonra ayakta kalmalarý çok zor.
Gümüþ Üye
ZAMANINDA kazanýrken daha çok mu vergi vermiþler, çalýþanlara daha mý çok yüksek ücret vermiþler, kazanýrken iyi iþler ters gidince kurtarýn bizi, o zaman çalýþan ve emeklide istiyor var mý veren? bence
Burada yer alan yatýrým bilgi,yorum ve tavsiyeleri yatýrým danýÞmanlýðý kapsamýnda deðildir yorum ve tavsiyeler, yorum ve tavsiyede bulunanlarýn kiÞisel görüÞlerine dayanmaktadýr.
Üye
Bir arkadaþým var.
Kafe iþletiyor.
Geçen sene yaklaþýk 5.5 Milyon civarý cebine para koydu.
Bahsettim rakam tüm iþlemler bittikten sonra kendisine kalan.
2023 için gelir vergisi matrahý 140.000TL idi bu adamýn...
Bronz Üye
ayda 500 bin liraya yakýn para demek.. orta halli bir kafe iþletmecisi bu durumdaysa, gerisini artýk siz hesap edin.. bu arada vergi konusunda ise oldukça cömert davranmýþ. ya da muhasebecisi pek iþi bilen birisi deðil.
ytd..
Powell'ýn konuþma metni
August 23, 2024
Review and Outlook
Chair Jerome H. Powell
Four and a half years after COVID-19's arrival, the worst of the pandemic-related economic distortions are fading. Inflation has declined significantly. The labor market is no longer overheated, and conditions are now less tight than those that prevailed before the pandemic. Supply constraints have normalized. And the balance of the risks to our two mandates has changed. Our objective has been to restore price stability while maintaining a strong labor market, avoiding the sharp increases in unemployment that characterized earlier disinflationary episodes when inflation expectations were less well anchored. We have made a good deal of progress toward that outcome. While the task is not complete, we have made a good deal of progress toward that outcome.
Today, I will begin by addressing the current economic situation and the path ahead for monetary policy. I will then turn to a discussion of economic events since the pandemic arrived, exploring why inflation rose to levels not seen in a generation, and why it has fallen so much while unemployment has remained low.
Near-Term Outlook for Policy
Let's begin with the current situation and the near-term outlook for policy.
For much of the past three years, inflation ran well above our 2 percent goal, and labor market conditions were extremely tight. The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) primary focus has been on bringing down inflation, and appropriately so. Prior to this episode, most Americans alive today had not experienced the pain of high inflation for a sustained period. Inflation brought substantial hardship, especially for those least able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation. High inflation triggered stress and a sense of unfairness that linger today.1
Our restrictive monetary policy helped restore balance between aggregate supply and demand, easing inflationary pressures and ensuring that inflation expectations remained well anchored. Inflation is now much closer to our objective, with prices having risen 2.5 percent over the past 12 months (figure 1).2 After a pause earlier this year, progress toward our 2 percent objective has resumed. My confidence has grown that inflation is on a sustainable path back to 2 percent.
Turning to employment, in the years just prior to the pandemic, we saw the significant benefits to society that can come from a long period of strong labor market conditions: low unemployment, high participation, historically low racial employment gaps, and, with inflation low and stable, healthy real wage gains that were increasingly concentrated among those with lower incomes.3
Today, the labor market has cooled considerably from its formerly overheated state. The unemployment rate began to rise over a year ago and is now at 4.3 percent-still low by historical standards, but almost a full percentage point above its level in early 2023 (figure 2). Most of that increase has come over the past six months. So far, rising unemployment has not been the result of elevated layoffs, as is typically the case in an economic downturn. Rather, the increase mainly reflects a substantial increase in the supply of workers and a slowdown from the previously frantic pace of hiring. Even so, the cooling in labor market conditions is unmistakable. Job gains remain solid but have slowed this year.4 Job vacancies have fallen, and the ratio of vacancies to unemployment has returned to its pre-pandemic range. The hiring and quits rates are now below the levels that prevailed in 2018 and 2019. Nominal wage gains have moderated. All told, labor market conditions are now less tight than just before the pandemic in 2019-a year when inflation ran below 2 percent. It seems unlikely that the labor market will be a source of elevated inflationary pressures anytime soon. We do not seek or welcome further cooling in labor market conditions.
Overall, the economy continues to grow at a solid pace. But the inflation and labor market data show an evolving situation. The upside risks to inflation have diminished. And the downside risks to employment have increased. As we highlighted in our last FOMC statement, we are attentive to the risks to both sides of our dual mandate.
The time has come for policy to adjust. The direction of travel is clear, and the timing and pace of rate cuts will depend on incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.
We will do everything we can to support a strong labor market as we make further progress toward price stability. With an appropriate dialing back of policy restraint, there is good reason to think that the economy will get back to 2 percent inflation while maintaining a strong labor market. The current level of our policy rate gives us ample room to respond to any risks we may face, including the risk of unwelcome further weakening in labor market conditions.
The Rise and Fall of Inflation
Let's now turn to the questions of why inflation rose, and why it has fallen so significantly even as unemployment has remained low. There is a growing body of research on these questions, and this is a good time for this discussion.5 It is, of course, too soon to make definitive assessments. This period will be analyzed and debated long after we are gone.
The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic led quickly to shutdowns in economies around the world. It was a time of radical uncertainty and severe downside risks. As so often happens in times of crisis, Americans adapted and innovated. Governments responded with extraordinary force, especially in the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the CARES Act. At the Fed, we used our powers to an unprecedented extent to stabilize the financial system and help stave off an economic depression.
After a historically deep but brief recession, in mid-2020 the economy began to grow again. As the risks of a severe, extended downturn receded, and as the economy reopened, we faced the risk of replaying the painfully slow recovery that followed the Global Financial Crisis.
Congress delivered substantial additional fiscal support in late 2020 and again in early 2021. Spending recovered strongly in the first half of 2021. The ongoing pandemic shaped the pattern of the recovery. Lingering concerns over COVID weighed on spending on in-person services. But pent-up demand, stimulative policies, pandemic changes in work and leisure practices, and the additional savings associated with constrained services spending all contributed to a historic surge in consumer spending on goods.
The pandemic also wreaked havoc on supply conditions. Eight million people left the workforce at its onset, and the size of the labor force was still 4 million below its pre-pandemic level in early 2021. The labor force would not return to its pre-pandemic trend until mid-2023 (figure 3).6 Supply chains were snarled by a combination of lost workers, disrupted international trade linkages, and tectonic shifts in the composition and level of demand (figure 4). Clearly, this was nothing like the slow recovery after the Global Financial Crisis.
Enter inflation. After running below target through 2020, inflation spiked in March and April 2021. The initial burst of inflation was concentrated rather than broad based, with extremely large price increases for goods in short supply, such as motor vehicles. My colleagues and I judged at the outset that these pandemic-related factors would not be persistent and, thus, that the sudden rise in inflation was likely to pass through fairly quickly without the need for a monetary policy response-in short, that the inflation would be transitory. Standard thinking has long been that, as long as inflation expectations remain well anchored, it can be appropriate for central banks to look through a temporary rise in inflation.7
The good ship Transitory was a crowded one, with most mainstream analysts and advanced-economy central bankers on board.8 The common expectation was that supply conditions would improve reasonably quickly, that the rapid recovery in demand would run its course, and that demand would rotate back from goods to services, bringing inflation down.
For a time, the data were consistent with the transitory hypothesis. Monthly readings for core inflation declined every month from April to September 2021, although progress came slower than expected (figure 5). The case began to weaken around midyear, as was reflected in our communications. Beginning in October, the data turned hard against the transitory hypothesis.9 Inflation rose and broadened out from goods into services. It became clear that the high inflation was not transitory, and that it would require a strong policy response if inflation expectations were to remain well anchored. We recognized that and pivoted beginning in November. Financial conditions began to tighten. After phasing out our asset purchases, we lifted off in March 2022.
By early 2022, headline inflation exceeded 6 percent, with core inflation above 5 percent. New supply shocks appeared. Russia's invasion of Ukraine led to a sharp increase in energy and commodity prices. The improvements in supply conditions and rotation in demand from goods to services were taking much longer than expected, in part due to further COVID waves in the U.S.10 And COVID continued to disrupt production globally, including through new and extended lockdowns in China.11
High rates of inflation were a global phenomenon, reflecting common experiences: rapid increases in the demand for goods, strained supply chains, tight labor markets, and sharp hikes in commodity prices.12 The global nature of inflation was unlike any period since the 1970s. Back then, high inflation became entrenched-an outcome we were utterly committed to avoiding.
By mid-2022, the labor market was extremely tight, with employment increasing by over 6-1/2 million from the middle of 2021. This increase in labor demand was met, in part, by workers re****ing the labor force as health concerns began to fade. But labor supply remained constrained, and, in the summer of 2022, labor force participation remained well below pre-pandemic levels. There were nearly twice as many job openings as unemployed persons from March 2022 through the end of the year, signaling a severe labor shortage (figure 6).13 Inflation peaked at 7.1 percent in June 2022.
At this podium two years ago, I discussed the possibility that addressing inflation could bring some pain in the form of higher unemployment and slower growth. Some argued that getting inflation under control would require a recession and a lengthy period of high unemployment.14 I expressed our unconditional commitment to fully restoring price stability and to keeping at it until the job is done.
The FOMC did not flinch from carrying out our responsibilities, and our actions forcefully demonstrated our commitment to restoring price stability. We raised our policy rate by 425 basis points in 2022 and another 100 basis points in 2023. We have held our policy rate at its current restrictive level since July 2023 (figure 7).
The summer of 2022 proved to be the peak of inflation. The 4-1/2 percentage point decline in inflation from its peak two years ago has occurred in a context of low unemployment-a welcome and historically unusual result.
How did inflation fall without a sharp rise in unemployment above its estimated natural rate?
Pandemic-related distortions to supply and demand, as well as severe shocks to energy and commodity markets, were important drivers of high inflation, and their reversal has been a key part of the story of its decline. The unwinding of these factors took much longer than expected but ultimately played a large role in the subsequent disinflation. Our restrictive monetary policy contributed to a moderation in aggregate demand, which combined with improvements in aggregate supply to reduce inflationary pressures while allowing growth to continue at a healthy pace. As labor demand also moderated, the historically high level of vacancies relative to unemployment has normalized primarily through a decline in vacancies, without sizable and disruptive layoffs, bringing the labor market to a state where it is no longer a source of inflationary pressures.
A word on the critical importance of inflation expectations. Standard economic models have long reflected the view that inflation will return to its objective when product and labor markets are balanced-without the need for economic slack-so long as inflation expectations are anchored at our objective. That's what the models said, but the stability of longer-run inflation expectations since the 2000s had not been tested by a persistent burst of high inflation. It was far from assured that the inflation anchor would hold. Concerns over de-anchoring contributed to the view that disinflation would require slack in the economy and specifically in the labor market. An important takeaway from recent experience is that anchored inflation expectations, reinforced by vigorous central bank actions, can facilitate disinflation without the need for slack.
This narrative attributes much of the increase in inflation to an extraordinary collision between overheated and temporarily distorted demand and constrained supply. While researchers differ in their approaches and, to some extent, in their conclusions, a consensus seems to be emerging, which I see as attributing most of the rise in inflation to this collision.15 All told, the healing from pandemic distortions, our efforts to moderate aggregate demand, and the anchoring of expectations have worked together to put inflation on what increasingly appears to be a sustainable path to our 2 percent objective.
Disinflation while preserving labor market strength is only possible with anchored inflation expectations, which reflect the public's confidence that the central bank will bring about 2 percent inflation over time. That confidence has been built over decades and reinforced by our actions.
That is my assessment of events. Your mileage may vary.
Conclusion
Let me wrap up by emphasizing that the pandemic economy has proved to be unlike any other, and that there remains much to be learned from this extraordinary period. Our Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy emphasizes our commitment to reviewing our principles and making appropriate adjustments through a thorough public review every five years. As we begin this process later this year, we will be open to criticism and new ideas, while preserving the strengths of our framework. The limits of our knowledge-so clearly evident during the pandemi-demand humility and a questioning spirit focused on learning lessons from the past and applying them flexibly to our current challenges.
Son düzenleme : deniz43; 23-08-2024 saat: 17:18.
https://fintables.com/son-bilancolar
Bilançolar kötü gelmeye devam ediyor...Dün akþam gelen 14 bilançonun 9 tanesi zarar etmiþ,kalanlarýn 1 tanesi hariç, geri kalanlarýn karý da %37 ile %98 arasý deðiþen oranlarda düþmüþ.Borsamýz þirketlerinin deðerlemelerinin aþýrý primli olduðu,aþaðýya düþecek epeyce mesafesi olduðu objektif bir bakýþ açýsýyla gözüküyor.
Borsa endeksimizin son deðeri 284.5 usd,kabaca 2 yýl önce 13 Temmuz 2022 tarihinde 136.1 usd imiþ,hala dolar bazýnda son 2 yýl içinde %100'ün üzerinde primli ve bunu hak edecek þirket bilançolarý gelmiyor.
https://tr.tradingview.com/symbols/BIST-XU100.USD/
Ayný süre içinde MSCI Geliþmekte Olan Piyasalar Endeksi ise dolar cinsinden sadece %10.7 artmýþ.
https://tr.investing.com/indices/msci-emerging-markets
Mesela Hong Kong Hang Seng endeksi ayný sürede %13.2 düþmüþ.
https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/.HSI
Son düzenleme : deniz43; 24-08-2024 saat: 06:26.
https://www.ekonomim.com/ekonomi/the...-haberi-762526
The Economist: Türkiye'de zengin daha zengin, yoksul daha yoksul oluyor!
"The Economist, Türkiye'deki gelir eþitsizliðine yönelik bir analiz yayýmladý. Yazýda gelir farký uçurumunun derinleþtiðine dikkat çekilirken hem lüks tüketimin patladýðý hem de enflasyon yüzünden düþük ve orta gelirli kesimin alým gücünün eridiði vurgulandý.
-"Türkiye'de son yýllarda gelir adaletsizliði artarken, servet daðýlýmýnda da fark açýlýyor. En zengin yüzde 1'lik kesim servetin yüzde 40'ýný alýrken, yüksek enflasyon ortamý da bu makasý daha da açýyor. Zenginlerin servetlerinin arttýðý bu dönemde, yoksul da daha yoksullaþýyor."
-Hafta içi bir öðleden sonra, Ýstinye Park AVM'de butikler zarif bir þekilde hareketleniyor. Þehrin Michelin yýldýzlý restoranlarý aylarca dolup taþýyor ve yat limanlarý dolu. Türkiye'nin en büyük þehrinde, lüks mallarýn tüketimi artarken, þaþýrtýcý bir servet patlamasýnýn belirtileri her yerde görülüyor. Zenginler daha da zenginleþiyor: Türkiye'de ultra zenginlerinin (30 milyon dolar veya daha fazla servete sahip olanlar) sayýsý 2022 ile 2023 arasýnda yüzde 10 arttý. Ancak ortalama bir Türk'e daha zengin olduklarýný hissedip hissetmediklerini sorun, cevap neredeyse kesinlikle hayýr olacaktýr"
*******************************
"kara para","kayýt dýþý ekonomi" kazançlarý,yolsuzluk ekonomisi ve ücretlerin ve tasarruflarýn eritilerek küçük bir zümreye yapýlan devasa "servet transferi" küçük bir zümrenin fiyatýna bakmadan çýlgýnca sýnýrsýzca para harcamasý talep enflasyonu yaratmasý sonucunu getirdi.Temel ihtiyaçlarýný karþýlayamayan ücretlilerin ve emeklilerin satýn alma gücünü daha da eriterek ,açlýk sýnýrý altýnda yaþatarak, talep enflasyonunun geriletebileceðini düþünmek ise tam bir komedi.
Her yýl yüzmilyonlarca TL tüketim yapýp vergi kaydý olmayan binlerce kiþi var.Son vergi yasasýnda "nereden buldun" benzeri bir madde tasarý içinde vardý ve bu maddeye göre kazancýnýn kaynaðýný gösteremeyenler için, bu kazançlar vergilendirilecekti ama veto yedi.
Bu þekilde devam ederse gelir daðýlýmý daha da çok bozulmaya enflasyon da çok yüksek kalmaya devam eder.
Son düzenleme : deniz43; 24-08-2024 saat: 08:33.
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