...:::vobelıt:::...

[deniz43]

Deniz üstad ;

21 Ekim de ortaya çıkan durum sizce ne şekilde sonuçlanacak ?
Faiz düşecek mi ? Düşecek ise ne kadar düşürülecek ?
KAsım a ertelenecek mi ? Etkileri neler olabilir .

Eğer merkez bankamız makroekonomik dengeleri,verileri,uluslararası piyasa koşullarını değerlendirerek,ekonomi teorilerine uyumlu kararlar alan bir merkez bankası olsaydı,Perşembe günü ne karar çıkacağını bugünden herkes biliyor olurdu,nitekim örneğin ne ABD ne Avrupa merkez bankalarından, beklenenin dışında bir karar çıktığını çok nadir görüyoruz.Ama bizim merkez bankamızın bağımsızlığı kalmadı,yukarıdan ne talimat gelirse onu uyguluyor ve de bu talimatlar rasyonel olmadığı için açıklanacak hiç bir karar sürpriz olmamalı,her türlü karar çıkabilir,çıkınca görürüz.

[cevdet _060]

Günaydın dostlar, dolar 9.36 olmuş geceleri daha agresif oluyor akşam başka sabah başka dolar fiyatları ile uyanıyoruz. Gündüzün dinlenme modunda. AKP ile süreç uzadıkça dolar 14-15 lere kadar yolu var.

[pit]

PTF tavan fiyatı son 12 ayın ortalamasının 2 katı olabiliyordu ancak yeni karar ile tavan fiyatı 3 katına çıkarıldı. Buradan ben gelecek ciddi doğalgaz zammı öncesi doğalgaz santrallerinin elinin rahatlatılıp elektrik arzının sıkıntı olmamasının hedeflendiğini anlıyorum. Karar şimdilik ay sonuna kadar sınırlandırılmış olsa da uzatılma ihtimali çok yüksek.
Öte yandan eğer hükümet iş verenleri ikna edip asgari ücreti ciddi şekilde arttırmazsa bu kış dar gelirli kesim yoklukla karşı karşıya kalır. Enflasyon enerji krizi ile birlikte yönetilmesi zor duruma gelecek iyice ve başımızda asıl alanı ekonomi! olan biri var. Her kararı tek başına o verdiği için onun bilgi ve becerisi ile süreci yaşayacağız.

[Baygeorge]

Teşekkürler üstad ,

Eğer merkez bankamız makroekonomik dengeleri,verileri,uluslararası piyasa koşullarını değerlendirerek,ekonomi teorilerine uyumlu kararlar alan bir merkez bankası olsaydı,Perşembe günü ne karar çıkacağını bugünden herkes biliyor olurdu,nitekim örneğin ne ABD ne Avrupa merkez bankalarından, beklenenin dışında bir karar çıktığını çok nadir görüyoruz.Ama bizim merkez bankamızın bağımsızlığı kalmadı,yukarıdan ne talimat gelirse onu uyguluyor ve de bu talimatlar rasyonel olmadığı için açıklanacak hiç bir karar sürpriz olmamalı,her türlü karar çıkabilir,çıkınca görürüz.

[deniz43]

https://wolfstreet.com/2021/10/19/10...ikes-on-table/

10-Year Yield Jumps to 1.66% as Fed's Waller Gets Hawkish, Shreds Inflation Indexes that Strip out Food, Energy, & Outliers, Puts Faster Taper & Sooner Rate Hikes on Table

Fed yönetim kurulu üyesi Christopher J. Waller'ın önemli konuşması

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newse...r20211019a.htm

The Economic Outlook and a Cautionary Tale on "Idiosyncratic" Price Changes and Inflation

Her söylediğine katılmasam da,yıllar sonra ,ilk defa "yeni" bir Fed üyesinden tutarlı ,derli toplu,objektif analiz görüyoruz.Piyasalar için -önünü görmek açısından- çok önemli.

Ve Christopher J. Waller'ın konuşmasından sonra benchmark ABD 10 yıllık Hazine tahvillerinin faizi %1.66'lara zıpladı.


U.S. 10 Year Treasury
US10Y:

RT Quote | Exchange
Yield | 10:24 PM EDT
1.665%
quote price arrow up +0.03

[deniz43]

Christopher J. Waller'ın konuşmasının enflasyon ile ilgili kısmı

Inflation
Inflation has been running higher this year than I and most forecasters expected. It has not been high for just a month or two-it has been high all year. It is important to acknowledge that. The unexpected inflation we have observed has raised costs for households and businesses and complicated their planning, which has a real effect on people's lives. For the Fed, the question is whether higher inflation this year undermines moving toward our economic goals. On that score, I continue to believe that the escalation of inflation will be transitory and that inflation will move back toward our 2 percent target next year. That said, I am still greatly concerned about the upside risk that elevated inflation will not prove temporary.

We have seen substantial increases in many prices. Lumber prices skyrocketed through May but have largely retraced that increase in the past few months. Prices for used cars rose substantially from mid-2020 to mid-2021 but now seem to have stabilized at this higher level. At present, I am closely watching prices for housing services (rent and owners' equivalent rent), which saw modest increases last year but have picked up recently. In addition, energy prices have moved up noticeably in recent months, and market conditions suggest risk of further increases.

As I said earlier, I still see supply and demand working here to moderate price increases so that inflation moves back toward 2 percent. But I also see some upside pressures on inflation that bear watching. Bottlenecks have been worse and are lasting longer than I and most forecasters expected, and an important question that no one knows the answer to is how long these supply problems will persist. Through our business contacts, we continue to hear stories about bottlenecks at almost every stage of production and distribution-for example, plants that shut down because of a shortage of one or more crucial inputs; a poor cotton crop in the United States due to weather, which is driving up prices; and clogged ports and trucker shortages. Meanwhile, wage gains have been strong. That apparently has not made its way into prices yet, but how long before it becomes a factor driving inflation? Firms are reporting that they have more pricing power now than they have had in many years, as consumers seem to be accepting higher prices.

The simple answer is that I believe the next few months will be crucial to understanding whether elevated rates of inflation last and if that will trigger a lasting effect on the U.S. economy. We will know more as time goes on about whether inflation in the prices of those goods and services will level off or even fall, as lumber prices have, and how other prices will evolve. But, importantly, we will also know whether this period of higher inflation has started to affect expectations of future inflation.

A critical aspect of our new framework is to allow inflation to run above our 2 percent target (so that it averages 2 percent), but we should do this only if inflation expectations are consistent with our 2 percent target. If inflation expectations become unanchored, the credibility of our inflation target is at risk, and we likely would need to take action to re-anchor expectations at our 2 percent target.

This raises a couple of key questions: Whose inflation expectations do we examine, and how do we determine if they are unanchored? With regard to the first question, we measure inflation expectations two ways. First, we survey the public and ask them what they expect the inflation rate to be in coming years. The University of Michigan household survey and the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations are examples of this "survey approach." Second, we can infer inflation expectations from differences in yields between Treasury securities that are indexed for inflation and those that are not. These breakeven inflation measures from the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities market are referred to as "market based" measures of inflation compensation.

Survey measures give us an idea of what the average household expects inflation to be in the coming years. Presumably, this measure of expectations is important because it should influence households' wage demands as they seek compensation for an increasing cost of living. A key drawback of these measures is that the respondent incurs no benefit or cost from the accuracy of their forecast. This is why I have always preferred market-based measures of inflation expectations, because they are formed by investors who are betting with real money about future inflation. In short, they have skin in the game.

This brings us to another question: Are inflation expectations anchored around our inflation target of 2 percent? Survey measures have shown a dramatic increase in inflation expectations over the past few months. The recent New York Fed measure has short- and medium-term inflation expectations at 5.3 percent and 4.2 percent, respectively. This is eye opening and a genuine cause for concern should households embed these expectations in wage demands. However, market-based measures of inflation expectations and the five-year inflation expectations from the New York Fed survey continue to be anchored near our 2 percent target. I also look at the Board of Governors staff's common inflation expectations measure, which distills a signal from both surveys and market-based inflation gauges. At this point, at least, it remains near its average over the past decade. This gives me some comfort that the recent run of high inflation readings has not led to an unanchoring of inflation expectations. It is important to account for all measures of inflation expectations and not "cherry pick" the measure that one finds most comforting.

I would like to follow up on this last point as it pertains to thinking about inflation. As I mentioned earlier, a lot of commentators, including me, have deflected concerns about high inflation readings being the result of "outliers" or "idiosyncratic" price movements. As a result, recent high inflation readings are transitory and not broad based. But there is a fallacy in doing so that one should avoid in judging whether higher inflation is indeed transitory.

A basic tendency of statistical analysis is to exclude outlying or more volatile data. There are sound reasons for this, such as when we exclude volatile food and energy prices to get a measure of "core" inflation; that kind of measure often is more stable and can tell us whether the underlying forces behind inflation are moving as rapidly as it might seem from headline inflation. A similar logic applies to trimmed mean measures of inflation, such as the Cleveland Fed trimmed mean consumer price index and the Dallas Fed trimmed mean PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation rate. These measures censor the tails of the price change distribution to avoid having average inflation distorted by extreme price movements. However, inflation is distilled from many prices, and those prices do not move uniformly. As a result, we may be led to "falsely" dismiss certain price movements and risk being misled as to the true inflation rate.

Let me use a simple example to illustrate this point. Consider a three-good economy with goods A, B and C, and look at how their prices increase over time. In one world, the price of each good goes up 2 percent every year. Thus, average inflation is 2 percent every year, and there is no reason to question that measure, as it is broad based. This is typically what we have in mind when we think about trend inflation. In this world, inflation is meeting the FOMC's 2 percent target and there is no need for a policy change.

Now consider a world in which there are sharp price changes that are staggered across the goods. In year 1, the price of good A goes up 5 percent, while the price of goods B and C increase 2 percent. If we assume equal weights for each good, the inflation rate for this economy is 3 percent. This repeats in year 2, with the price of good B increasing 5 percent while the other two have increases of 2 percent. In year 3, good C sees the largest increase. In this economy, inflation averages 3 percent each year, which is above the FOMC's 2 percent inflation target.

Now, one could look at this data and manipulate it in several common ways. First, if one used a trimmed-mean measure of inflation, you would throw out the highest and the lowest readings for each year. What do you get? The average inflation rate would be 2 percent every year. Thus, over a three-year period, a trimmed mean measure of inflation would be 2 percent and indicate we are hitting our inflation target when the true measure would be 3 percent per year.

A second way of manipulating the data is to say in year 1, "Look, inflation is being driven by good A, which had an idiosyncratic, outsized price increase. If you throw it out, the underlying inflation rate is 2 percent." Then in year 2, you say, "Good B had an idiosyncratic price increase, so throw it out." Repeat for year 3. Again, by selectively throwing out unusually high price increases for individual goods, you would conclude that inflation over the three-year period is 2 percent and we are hitting the inflation target when, in fact, it was 3 percent.

Third, one can justify throwing out good A in the first year by saying it did not reflect a broad-based price increase-the prices of 67 percent of the goods rose 2 percent. So, based on these goods, we are hitting our inflation target. You would be correct but, again, misguided.

Finally, one could claim, correctly, that the large price increase for good A is "transitory"-it went up strikingly in year 1 but then dropped back, meaning inflation should fall back to our inflation target in coming periods. But that will mislead you in terms of understanding the true inflation rate, because you are putting zero probability that a large spike in inflation will happen to another good in the future.

The moral of this little example is that one needs to be careful when selectively ignoring data series-be it used car prices, food and energy prices, or household surveys of inflation expectations. All of these series convey important information about the evolution of inflation, and one should exhibit caution in dismissing data as outliers. We must keep our eyes open to inflationary pressures, wherever they come from, with consistency and rigor and stand ready to adjust policy if we conclude that such a change is warranted.

This brings me to how I believe monetary policy should evolve in the coming months, based on the outlook I have described. The near-term decision we face is when to begin slowing the pace of asset purchases, which have each month been adding to the level of financial accommodation provided by the Fed to support the economy. Our test for this step was making "substantial further progress" toward our employment and inflation goals. After years of running below 2 percent, the recent and sustained increase in inflation clearly represents substantial progress toward our goal. And the continued gains in employment, despite a couple of months of a slowdown, along with results across a range of labor market indicators, indicate to me that there has also been substantial further progress toward maximum employment. I support the FOMC beginning to reduce asset purchases following our meeting in November. Importantly, this action should not tighten financial conditions, since a later 2021 tapering has already been priced in by most participants.

One issue on which we should also be clear is the pace of tapering. I have said in the past that I favor a pace of tapering that would result in the end of asset purchases by the middle of 2022. Of course, if economic conditions and the outlook were to deteriorate significantly, we could slow or pause this tapering. And if the economy were to strengthen more than expected, the plan to rapidly end purchases would provide policy space in 2022 to act sooner than now anticipated to begin raising the target range for the federal funds rate.

Based on my outlook for the economy, however, I do not expect liftoff to occur soon after tapering is completed. The two policy actions are distinct. I believe the pace of continued improvement in the labor market will be gradual, and I expect inflation will moderate, which means liftoff is still some time off.

That said, as I mentioned earlier, if my upside risk for inflation comes to pass, with inflation considerably above 2 percent well into 2022, then I will favor liftoff sooner than I now anticipate. A major consideration will be my judgment about whether inflation expectations are at risk of becoming "unanchored"- rising substantially and persistently above 2 percent. My FOMC colleagues and I will be watching all of the data carefully in the coming weeks and months and will adjust policy as needed to help ensure the U.S. economy continues to recover from the effects of COVID, and that we continue to make progress toward our economic goals.

[deniz43]

Wednesday October 20 2021 Actual Previous Consensus
09:00 AM
DE
PPI MoM SEP 2.3% 1.5% 1%
09:00 AM
DE
PPI YoY SEP 14.2% 12% 12.7%

Almanya'da üretici fiyat endeksindeki yükseliş giderek hızlanarak devam ediyor

Almanya'da üreticilerin maliyetlerindeki astronomik artışlar üretici fiyat endeksindeki yıllık artışı 1974 petrol krizinden sonra 47 yıl sonra üretici fiyat endeksini en yüksek seviyeye taşıdı.(1974 yılında üretici fiyat endeksinde benzer oranda bir artışla Almanya'da enflasyon %7'5 un üzerine çıkmıştı)

[HATAKE]

https://eksisozluk.com/entry/129248856
https://m.bloomberght.com/ft-turkiye...abilir-2290094